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From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Evidences of Mirror Neurons
Date: 17 Mar 1999 11:40:00 GMT
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Mirror neurons is another of those surprises that neuroscience
gives us from time to time.
A report by Gallese et. al [1] shows a mechanism that allows
a monkey to "mind-read" a colleague.
The mirror neurons were discovered in monkey's premotor cortex and
the interesting aspect is that these neurons respond not only
when a particular motor action is done by the monkey but *also*
when the same action, performed by another monkey, is observed
by the former. In this case, the neurons act in a cortical
system that matches observation and execution of motor actions
in which goals are involved.
Experimental observation using PET suggest that a similar
mechanism also exists in humans (see [2]) and seem to involve
Broca's area.
It is interesting to see these experiments as indicating the
way learning by observation may occur and also to speculate that
a observationally learned task may ease the full learning of
the real task, which will, then, consist of acquiring the remaining
sensorimotor patterns. I guess that this is another way of
seeing learning as the successive refinement and completion
of vague and hollow patterns by interacting with the world.
Sergio Navega.
[1] Gallese, V. and Goldman, A. (1998) Mirror neurons and the
simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Vol 2, No. 12, Dec 1998
[2] Rizzolatti, G. and Arbib, M. (1998) Language within our grasp.
Trends Neurosci May 1998; 21(5):188-94
From: ohgs@chatham.demon.co.uk (Oliver Sparrow)
Subject: Re: Evidences of Mirror Neurons
Date: 18 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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"Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net> wrote:
>The mirror neurons were discovered in monkey's premotor cortex and
>the interesting aspect is that these neurons respond not only
>when a particular motor action is done by the monkey but *also*
>when the same action, performed by another monkey, is observed
>by the former.
You are lucky that Longley is no longer with this group (?). This
looks like an intensionality engine, revealed. You would get quoted to
death: this cannot be so!
I believe that we are going to find that the brain uses defined
capabilities and dedicated specialist tissue both to exercise
cognitive skills and also either to filter input or to deliver output.
Thinking about throwing a ball and throwing it will use many of the
same structures. Indeed, sleep paralysis may be a generalisation of
the machinery that allows us to think about throwing and not actually
throw. If this is so, then the Bill Calvin model of the brain as a
competing set of agencies, which strive to dominate processor space at
the expense of rivals may be more than a projection of the Eighties
upon our cognitive processes (Sorry, Bill.)
:=)
_______________________________
Oliver Sparrow
From: "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net>
Subject: Re: Evidences of Mirror Neurons
Date: 18 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT
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Oliver Sparrow wrote in message <36f5c164.4796681@news.demon.co.uk>...
> "Sergio Navega" <snavega@ibm.net> wrote:
>
>>The mirror neurons were discovered in monkey's premotor cortex and
>>the interesting aspect is that these neurons respond not only
>>when a particular motor action is done by the monkey but *also*
>>when the same action, performed by another monkey, is observed
>>by the former.
>
>You are lucky that Longley is no longer with this group (?). This
>looks like an intensionality engine, revealed. You would get quoted to
>death: this cannot be so!
>
I would appreciate Longley's vision on this situation. But if he
quotes something by Quine on this subject, I'll dismiss it at once:
Quine cannot compete with the neurophysiologists I mentioned (at
least on the matter of describing how our brain really works!).
>I believe that we are going to find that the brain uses defined
>capabilities and dedicated specialist tissue both to exercise
>cognitive skills and also either to filter input or to deliver output.
>Thinking about throwing a ball and throwing it will use many of the
>same structures. Indeed, sleep paralysis may be a generalisation of
>the machinery that allows us to think about throwing and not actually
>throw. If this is so, then the Bill Calvin model of the brain as a
>competing set of agencies, which strive to dominate processor space at
>the expense of rivals may be more than a projection of the Eighties
>upon our cognitive processes (Sorry, Bill.)
:=)
I'm not sure if I grasped your critic to Calvin correctly. In a sense,
mirror neurons can suggest that he is right. The throwing hypothesis
says something like cognition flourishing because of the reuse of
sensorimotor patterns developed when one learns to throw things. The
aspect I like most in this theory is its coherence from bottom to top:
like Piaget, there is a straight line conducing sensorimotor experiences
to be reused and support higher level cognition (language included).
Another aspect is that Calvin proposes the emergence of the dominant
"thought" through a competition, in darwinian terms, among several
"fronts" of activation. When the fronts differ only slightly, Calvin
proposes the formation of chaotic attractors, which behaves very
plausibly to our moments of "indecision" (we change our mind just like
what happens with a Lorentz attractor). I guess that in this moment
one can take Longley's preferred criticism to human decision process
and cite Tversky & Kahneman. But suppose one can "learn" to think
correctly, avoiding the base rate fallacy. Even then, I have no reasons
to believe that our brain would work differently than the process that
Calvin hypothesized.
Regards,
Sergio Navega.
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